# THREAT REPORT: INFERNOGRABBER AND VOIDLINK RANSOMWARE CAMPAIGN

## Visual Summary




How far down the attack chain this campaign reached; deepest phase in crimson.




The control that most disrupts the attack (priority in crimson).

## Summary

The observed cluster of activity involves the use of InfernoGrabber and VoidLink malware families, although the threat actor and targeted country remain unknown. The techniques inferred from the report suggest a focus on user execution and phishing. Priority should be given to hardening defenses against social-engineering delivery to prevent the execution of these malware families. The operational risk band is considered low, reaching the execution stage.

## Threat Overview

The threat actor, whose identity is insufficient to determine, is associated with the InfernoGrabber and VoidLink malware families. The central vulnerability exploited is unknown, and the targeted sectors and

countries are also insufficient to determine. The techniques inferred from the report include user execution and phishing, with phishing being the priority technique.

## Attack Chain and Priority Control

The attack chain involves techniques such as user execution and phishing, which ultimately lead to the execution of the InfernoGrabber and VoidLink malware families. The priority technique is T1566 Phishing, which serves as a chokepoint in the attack chain. To mitigate this, the priority control is to "Harden against social-engineering delivery across email, links and voice/callback lures: attachment sandboxing and link rewriting, block macro-enabled Office docs from the internet zone, train users to verify unexpected requests out-of-band, deploy a report-phish button, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA."

## Infrastructure and Corroboration

There is no observable hosting provider or ASN associated with this campaign, and no malware families have been corroborated by abuse.ch. Additionally, AbuseIPDB has not flagged any indicators with a confidence level of 80% or higher, with the highest confidence seen being 0%.

---

## Technical Appendix

*Ground-truth telemetry from the source pulse; analytical scores are secondary and clearly labelled.*

### Observed Techniques (ATT&CK, machine-extracted from report text — reduced confidence)

*The source pulse carried no expert ATT&CK tags, so these techniques were inferred from its narrative by a self-consensus LLM extractor and validated against the ATT&CK catalogue. Treat this technique set, and the chokepoint, kill-chain and risk scores derived from it, as lower-confidence than an expert-tagged brief.* - T1204 User Execution - T1566 Phishing

### Analytical Scores

- Priority technique (graph chokepoint): T1566 Phishing (centrality 0.7071).
- Operational risk: Low (score 0.17, reaches execution).

### Behavioral Signature Cluster

- Method: technique-overlap cosine vs 170 MITRE ATT&CK Groups (top overlap 0.7071; reference threshold tau = 0.6).
- These are behavioural resemblances for defensive playbook cross-referencing, not an identity assessment. Where the source pulse names an actor, that attribution is authoritative; the overlaps below neither confirm nor contest it.

Nearest historical profiles by behavioural overlap (resemblance only):

| Historical Profile | Behavioural Overlap |
|---|---|
| APT30 | 0.7071 |
| TA459 | 0.5 |
| AppleJeus | 0.5 |
| APT12 | 0.4714 |
| Mofang | 0.4714 |

### Enrichment Signal

- Highest AbuseIPDB confidence among IOCs: 0%.

### Indicators of Compromise (defanged — non-clickable)

The network and file indicators observed in this activity are listed below for blocklisting:

| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Hash | 07c39f79ab92fb21557b82283472dce1c112f577d796111fb752c3c6d84c86b5 |

---

## Flame Cell // Adversary Pivot [ BETA ]

*BETA. A hypothetical tabletop projection, anchored to documented ATT&CK behaviour and technique co-occurrence across 170 tracked groups. It is not a prediction; treat it as a war-game prompt and review before acting. Spot a pivot that looks wrong? norbert@salacti.com*

- **Control applied:** T1566 Phishing (initial-access)
- **Observed here:** T1566 Phishing was the initial-access control point; blocking a means-of-entry rarely stops a determined actor, so the pivot projects forward to the execution stage they must still reach.
- **Projected pivot:** T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution (execution)
- **Basis:** of the 38+ groups that use Phishing, this pairing runs 1.6x above base rate, a disproportionately-coupled move rather than the obvious one.

The actor could pivot to T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution to maintain their objective by leveraging vulnerabilities in client applications, such as browsers or Office software, which may be exposed through user interaction or unpatched software, thereby potentially allowing the execution of malicious code on the client-side. This technique may be particularly appealing to the actor as it can be used to bypass the phishing block by directly exploiting client vulnerabilities, potentially leading to a more targeted and effective attack. The defensive countermeasure to mitigate this would be to patch client applications, enable exploit mitigations such as ASLR, DEP, and CFG, and implement application isolation.

**Also plausible (same tactic):** T1053 Scheduled Task/Job (n=43, lift 1.3), T1106 Native API (n=18, lift 1.6)

**Detection and hardening for the pivot (T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution)**

- **Telemetry:** EDR process + memory telemetry; Office/browser/reader child-process telemetry; Windows Error Reporting (application crashes)
- **Detect:**
  - Office, browser or PDF-reader processes (winword/excel/outlook/acrobat/chrome) spawning shells or LOLBINs
  - Sysmon 1 anomalous children of document/browser apps; unbacked-memory execution right after a client crash
  - WER application-crash events for client apps immediately followed by a new child process
- **Harden:**
  - Patch client software fast (browsers, Office, PDF, Java); retire end-of-life plugins
  - ASR rules blocking Office child processes; exploit protection (DEP/ASLR/CFG) and browser sandboxing
- **MITRE:** M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing, M1050 Exploit Protection, M1051 Update Software, M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint · DS0009 Process, DS0011 Module, DS0015 Application Log